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Abstract—In a mobile ad hoc network we consider the prob-
lem of designing a reputation system that allows to update and
to propagate the computed reputation scores while tolerating
Byzantine failures. Each time a correct node uses directly
a service, it can determine by itself the quality of service
currently provided. This fresh and valid rating information
is broadcast immediately to all its current neighbors. Then,
while the mobile node moves, it can receive from other nodes
other recommendations also related to the same service. Thus
it updates continuously its own opinion. Meanwhile it continues
to broadcast this updated information. The freshness and the
validity of the received/sent information become questionable.
We propose a protocol that allows a node to ignore a second
hand information when this information is not fresh or not
valid. In particular, fake values provided by Byzantine nodes
are eliminated when they are not consistent with those gathered
from correct nodes. When the quality of service stabilizes, the
correct nodes are supposed to provide quite similar recom-
mendations. In this case, we demonstrate that the proposed
protocol ensures convergence to a range of possible reputation
scores if a necessary condition is satisfied by the mobile nodes.
Simulations are conducted in random mobility scenarios. The
results show that our algorithm has a better performance than
typical methods proposed in previous works.
Keywords-reputation; mobile ad-hoc network; byzantine;
I. INTRODUCTION
In a mobile ad hoc network, nodes cooperate in a dis-
tributed and self-organized way to achieve some predefined
goals. Thanks to a reputation mechanism, each node can
benefit from the monitoring of the quality of service per-
formed by others and can decide to interact or not with a
service provider. A service provider is called a trustee, while
a service user is called a truster. In this study we consider
that a service is provided either by a fixed device located
in a particular place or by a specific mobile node. In both
cases, the user and the service provider must share the same
location to be able to interact. We assume that a service user
is necessarily a mobile node. Moreover, even if a service
is not used by all the mobile nodes, the nodes which do
not act as a truster/user (for this particular trustee/service)
participate to the computation of its reputation score.
The quality of service provided by a trustee fluctuates
all over the time. Of course, this instability can be the
consequence of a failure affecting the trustee. But, even
in the case of a correct trustee, the provided quality of
service may evolve smoothly all the time (improvement
or degradation phases). As a consequence, the reputation
of a trustee computed by a mobile node is a belief level
that has to be updated continuously. When a node uses a
service, it can attest the quality of service provided by the
corresponding trustee. This direct observation is performed
by a user while it interacts with the trustee. At the end
of the interaction, the rating provided by a correct truster
is called a first hand information. This information is both
fresh and valid. It can be shared immediately with the nodes
located within the communication range of the user. Yet,
broadcasting only first hand information is not sufficient:
a user has a limited wireless communication range and
cannot provide its rating to all the nodes. To propagate the
information, each node (even those that are far from the
trustee or those that have never used its service) must, on
one side, broadcast its current estimate of the reputation of
the trustee within its own neighborhood and, on the other
side, update this estimation with the received values that
seem to be fresh and valid. Thanks to this computation and
propagation of second hand information, all the trusters can
obtain indirectly a (more or less accurate) estimation of the
recent quality of service provided by a given trustee.
We consider an unreliable ad hoc network. Some mobile
nodes may suffer from Byzantine failures. By definition,
these Byzantine nodes may behave arbitrarily. In particular,
when they execute the reputation protocol, they may provide
fake information (about the perceived quality of service or
the freshness of their estimation). Identifying the received
data that have to be ignored is a key problem. During its
moving within the covered geographical area, a correct node
gathers data provided by the (correct and faulty) encountered
nodes. The proposed protocol allows to identify among these
received estimations those that are not fresh enough or not
valid. The computation of second hand information must
rely only on messages that meet timeliness and validity
requirements. To reach this goal, the protocol assumes an up-
per bound f on the number of Byzantine nodes. It postpones
an update of the local reputation estimation until the node
has gathered a sufficient number of recent values (between
f + 1 and 2f + 1 values depending on the circumstances).
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows. First an algorithm to propagate and update the
reputation scores is proposed. This protocol is designed
to address three major issues namely: i) the participating
nodes are mobile and the communication graph is constantly
changing, ii) some nodes are Byzantine nodes and some-
times their inputs have to be ignored (validity requirement),
and iii) out-dated values provided by correct or faulty nodes
have also to be filtered out as the quality of service provided
by a trustee is fluctuating (timeliness requirement). The pro-
posed algorithm is inspired from a linear iterative consensus
algorithm [1] which has been extended to fit the specific
requirements of this different problem. The algorithm is
distributed and all nodes perform asynchronous actions (e.g.,
when a node updates its local reputation scores, other
nodes are perhaps still moving to collect new messages).
Second, we provide a theoretical analysis of the proposed
protocol to demonstrate that some convergence properties
can be satisfied if the dynamic topology satisfies a particular
condition. Obviously, if a correct node remains isolated, it
cannot update its estimations and thus convergence between
all the nodes is impossible. The proposed condition aims to
fix some additional constraints that have to be satisfied by the
mobility scheme of all the correct nodes. Assuming that the
quality of service provided by a trustee is stable and equal
to b with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, when all the correct trusters (which
may have subjective opinions) provide first hand information
which are in the range [a, c] with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1,
we demonstrate that the estimations of the reputation score
established by the correct nodes converge also to the same
interval if the identified condition is satisfied. Third, simula-
tions are conducted. Based on two mobility model (random
and regional random), we simulate our algorithm and also
some other strategies that have been proposed in former
works. The results show that the proposed algorithm reaches
convergence and reach this objective more quickly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
sketches out some related works. Section III introduces
the system model. In Section IV, we establish a Bayesian
Reputation System and then in Section V we give out
the problem description. In Section VI, a new reputation
dissemination and updating algorithm based on a linear
iteration consensus method is proposed. In Section VII we
focus on the reputation convergence and give some details
about the condition that has to be satisfied. In Section VIII,
we evaluate the performance through simulations.
II. RELATED WORKS
Many works consider reputation systems in mobile ad hoc
networks [2]: reputation propagation and updating are two
main issues. The propagation allows to provide a recent
knowledge to a node that has not yet (or not recently)
interacted with a trustee. In [3], the propagation is based
on flooding and the use of multiple routes. [4] proposes a
method based on rendezvous. Yet, it requires that no con-
secutive Byzantine nodes are along a single communication
path. This requirement is hard to ensure in a mobile network.
In [5], trust is assumed to degrade automatically when the
propagation hop length increases but in practice, such a
degradation is not always observed. In all these works, only
first hand information are propagated without modifying
them while our solution relies on a mixing of the received
values with the receiver’s opinion.
In [6], all the nodes are correct and the network is
assumed to be fault free. In the presence of malicious
nodes, different strategies have been proposed to detect and
suppress the invalid recommendations that can be generated
during the propagation process. In [7], [8], a deviation test
is implemented: a comparison is made between the value
contained in a receive message and the corresponding local
record. If the deviation is greater than a threshold, then the
value is ignored. The solution proposed in [9] is based on
the aggregation of multiple observations related to the same
trustee: within the set of collected observations, abnormal
gathered values are suppressed. Other works [10], [11] rely
on the level of trust to identify the invalid recommendations.
A received message is suppressed if the receiver considers
that the sender is un-trusted (e.g. the corresponding local
trust record is lower than a threshold). Yet, this solution
is not robust enough. For example, a Byzantine node can
provide a good quality of service to obtain a high level
of trust, but when it has to relay recommendations, it may
generate fake values that are not discarded.
Note that the two above methods do not consider a
timeliness requirement. In a mobile environment, it could
be the case that only a few trusters interact with a trustee
during a period of time. In that case only these few nodes
have fresh ratings. Yet, in the solutions described in [7], [8],
this recent information can be ignored by other nodes if the
deviation between the new value and the old ones exceeds
the threshold. Similarly, in the solution described in [9], this
new information provided only by a few nodes can also be
deemed as abnormal and rejected. In [12] the authors point
out that the reputation is timeliness. When new values are
aggregated, time is considered as a forgetting factor.
III. MODEL
We consider a mobile ad-hoc network composed of n
mobile nodes. An unique identifier pi (with i ranging from
1 to n) is assigned to each node. The notation V represents
the whole set of nodes: V = {p1, p2, ..., pn}. Throughout the
computation, the nodes move but still remain in a pre-defined
limited geographical area. Collisions between the physical
entities are not considered: several nodes can be located in
the same place at the same time. No assumption is made
about their trajectories: they can be random or predefined.
Some nodes may suffer from Byzantine failures. At any
time a Byzantine node can behave arbitrarily: it may send
fake messages, delay/drop messages or even stop its com-
putation. Nevertheless, the adversary power of a Byzantine
node is partially limited. We suppose that a Byzantine node
can not use fake identities to communicate with other nodes.
Therefore, a node can always identify the real sender of any
message it receives. Thanks to this limitation, when dupli-
cated messages originate from a same (correct or Byzantine)
node, unnecessary messages can be easily detected and
suppressed to keep only one of them (more precisely the
one that seems to be the most recent one). Nodes that are
not faulty are called correct nodes: they always follow the
protocol’s specification. The set of nodes V is partitioned
into two disjoint subsets denoted Vc (the set of correct nodes)
and Vb (the set of Byzantine nodes). We assume that an
upper bound on the number of Byzantine nodes (denoted
f ) exists and is known. By definition, | Vb |≤ f and
| Vc |≥ n − f . Of course, the correct nodes don’t known
the number and the identities of the Byzantine nodes.
The wireless nodes communicate with each other only by
exchanging messages. A node can only communicate with
the nodes (called its neighbors) that are located within its
limited radio communication range. Consequently, the com-
munication graph is dynamic. As wireless communication
can be interfered, some messages can be lost. Consequently,
even if two correct nodes are neighbors, it could be the case
that these nodes are not able to communicate or that only
one of them successfully provide information to the other
one. When the network is not heavy loaded, message losses
are rare and a mutual exchange of information between
neighbors is often possible. The message passing delay de-
pends on many parameters (channel conditions, scheduling
algorithm, arrival rate, etc). Works [13] on the propagation
delay in ad hoc networks pointed out that the message
transfer delay between two neighbors is usually in the order
of a few milliseconds. In this study, when a message is
successfully transferred, the delay can be ignored. Indeed
all the upper bounds used in our protocol to identify time
intervals are clearly of a different order of magnitude.
Nodes may start the computation at different times and no
global scheduler synchronizes their actions. Yet, we require
that the local clocks of the correct nodes are reasonably
synchronized. The maximum difference between any two
correct nodes’ clock values must be very low compared to
the upper bounds on time intervals used in the protocol.
Within the geographical area covered by the n nodes,
some services are available and can be used by the mobile
nodes. The set ofm services is denoted S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}.
The rules for accessing a service have not to be known by the
proposed protocol which just relies on the fact that a rating
feedback is generated by the user after each interaction.
This feedback is called a first hand information. The opinion
expressed by a node pi on the provided quality of service
is based only on what pi has observed directly.
Two main scenarios are possible. In the first case, each
service sx is available in a fixed location and can be used by
a node pi only when pi is located in this specific place. In
the second case, each service sx is provided by a particular
node py of V and can be used by a node pi whenever
their two paths intersect: pi can access to the service sx
while it is in the communication range of py. Even if the
proposed protocol covers the two cases, we focus mainly
on the second scenario (especially during the simulation
process). As a service sx is provided by a node py, it could
be the case that py is a Byzantine node. In that case the
quality of service may be arbitrary. When py is correct,
the provided quality of service is often quite stable and
never random. Even when it is not stable, the deviations are
not frequent and rather progressive. Usually, a correct node
provides a degraded quality of service only when it faces
resource scarcity (lack of memory storage, energy limitation,
...). Under such assumptions, the design of a reputation
system (to predict the future quality of service based on
some recent past observations) is a relevant approach.
To simplify the presentation of the protocol, we assume
that a single service s1 is available: m is equal to 1. As all
the services are managed independently, there is no loss of
generality. This unique service is offered by a node ps. All
the nodes of V are involved in the execution of the reputation
protocol. Only a subset of the correct nodes is supposed to
use the service and only some of them do this on a quite
regular basis: those particular nodes belong to a subset of
Vc denoted Θ.
IV. A BAYESIAN REPUTATION SYSTEM
To compute the reputation score for the trustee ps, a
node pi uses beta probability density functions. A beta
distribution function is represented by a tuple parameter
〈αi, βi〉 where αi (respectively βi) represents the amount
of positive (respectively negative) ratings counted by pi.
The corresponding probability density function f(x|αi, βi)
is expressed by the equation (1).
f(x|αi, βi) =
Γ(αi + βi)
Γ(αi)Γ(βi)
xαi−1(1 − x)βi−1 (1)
The probability variable x satisfies 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and αi ≥
1, βi ≥ 1. The probability expectation value of the beta
distribution is given by:
E(x) =
αi
αi + βi
(2)
Ris denotes the reputation data maintained by the node
pi. Ris corresponds to a tuple 〈αi, βi〉. The corresponding
reputation score is denoted v(Ris). This value is the prob-
ability expectation value computed with the formula (2). It
is a real value which belongs to [0, 1]. The value v(Ris)
represents the level of trust of pi with regards to the service
s1 provided by ps. If v(Ris) is close to 1, ps is considered by
pi as being a good service provider. On the contrary, when
v(Ris) is close to 0, pi considers that ps is a bad service
provider. Initially, as pi has no knowledge about the service
s1, Ris is set to 〈1, 1〉. Thus v(Ris) is initially equal to 0.5.
During the computation, αi and βi will be updated when
pi obtains new informations. A new information can be
generated by pi itself when it uses directly the service. In that
case, pi which is close enough from ps to be able to interact
with it, generates a first hand information (denoted Fhis) at
the end of the interaction. A first hand informations reflects
the opinion of the truster pi about the quality of service
provided by the trustee ps. By assumption, this opinion
which may be subjective is however rather close from the
effective quality of service provided by ps. The notation Sq
represents the real quality of service provided by ps when
the service s1 has been used for the last time by one node.
The reputation score does not evolve only when first hand
information are locally generated. Each node also dissem-
inates its current estimation of the reputation score. The
information received by pi from another node pj is called
a second hand information (denoted Shjs). Of course, a
Byzantine node can generate fake second hand information.
Section VI details the protocol which updates the reputation
score based on the first hand and second hand information.
V. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In a mobile ad hoc network, where up to f Byzantine
nodes may exist, each correct node maintains an estimation
of the reputation score which has to be as close as possible
from Sq , the quality of service provided by ps during its
last interaction. By assumption, when a node pi generates
a first hand information, this objective is satisfied: at that
time, Fhis and Sq are values that are quite close. When the
estimation becomes a mix of first hand and second hand
informations, the following convergence property ensures
that all the estimations computed by correct nodes converge.
Definition 1: (Convergence Property) When the quality of
service provided by ps is stable, all the new generated first
hand informations belong to an interval [MinFh,MaxFh]
and eventually all the computed reputation scores belongs
to the interval [MinFh − ǫ,MaxFh + ǫ] (ǫ is a positive
parameter close from zero).
VI. THE REPUTATION ALGORITHM
Figure 1 depicts the variables managed by a correct
node pi involved in the reputation protocol. To simplify
the notations, we no more refer to the identity of the
unique trustee ps (e.g. FShis −→ FShi, Fhis −→ Fhi,
Shis −→ Shi). At a first layer, a correct node pi uses a
variable FShi to keep the value of either its last first hand
information or a second hand information. FShi is a pair
[x, y] where x denotes the number of satisfactory interactions
and y denotes the number of unsatisfactory interactions. At
a second layer, pi manages the reputation score Ris.
FShi
filter
 
share
 
truster pi
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Figure 1. Variables managed by a node pi at two different layers
Layer 1 is devoted to the operations on FShi. The
value of FShi has to be propagated within the network.
Therefore, pi broadcasts periodically FShi to its current
neigbhors to share its current knowledge. The value of FShi
is updated by pi in two different cases. First an update is
done when pi uses the service and generates a first hand
information Fhi. In that case, Fhi becomes immediately the
new value of FShi. When pi receives enough second hand
information, it can also update its variable FShi to mix its
previous knowledge with the new received information that
seem to be fresh and valid. Due to the fact that Byzantine
nodes can propose unfair positive ratings or unfair negative
ratings, this second type of update is more complex. Two
main steps are required to identify fresh and valid second
hand information. First out-dated information have to be
suppressed. Then only the received information that are valid
have to be selected. This selection process is inspired from a
solution proposed to solve the linear approximate Byzantine
consensus problem [1]. More precisely, all the received
second hand informations are logged in a set denoted Nebi
where at most one message per external node is stored.
When enough messages from different nodes are contained
in Nebi, the risky messages are identified and suppressed.
To test the freshness of a value, the date at which the value
has been computed by the sender is checked. Note that a
Byzantine node can easily pass this first test by providing a
recent date. But to circumvent the validity test, a Byzantine
node has to provide a value that is rather similar to the fresh
values provided by correct nodes. Indeed a second hand
estimation v is considered as being a valid information if
at least one correct node has proposed a fresh value lower
than or equal to v and at least one correct node has proposed
a fresh value greater than or equal to v. Finally all the
remaining fresh and valid values are combined with the
current value of FShi to compute the next value of FShi.
The pseudo code executed by a correct node pi is provided
in Figure 2. Layer 1 contains four tasks while layer 2 is
composed of only one task. The lines 1-4 initialize the
four main variables managed by truster pi. Initially the
reputation rating Ris is set to 〈1, 1〉 to indicate that pi feels
uncertainty about the trustee s (line 1). FShi which is used
% Initialization of node pi
1: Ris ← 〈1, 1〉;
2: FShi ← 〈1, 1〉;
3: ti ← t0;
4: Nebi ← ∅;
% The protocol steps of Layer 1
task 1:
5: if ((clocki() − t0)%cycle equals to 0) then
6: pi broadcasts 〈FShi, ti〉;
7: end if
task 2:
8: if (new Fhi is obtained) then
9: FShi ← Fhi
10: ti ← clocki();
11: Nebi ← ∅;
12: end if
task 3:
13: if (〈FShj, tj〉 is received & tj ≥ ti ) then
14: Nebi ← 〈FShj , tj〉 ∪Nebi;
15: end if
16: if (Nebi is updated) then
17: Nebi ←sort(Nebi);
18: x ← the number of values bigger or equal than v(FShi);
19: y ← the number of values less or equal than v(FShi);
20: if (x ≥ f + 1 or y ≥ f + 1) then
21: RNebi ← reducing(Nebi , f );
22: FShi ←update(FShi, RNebi);
23: Nebi ← ∅;
24: end if
25: end if
task 4:
26: Suppress the values in Nebi received before clocki()−∆;
% The protocol steps of Layer 2
27: if (FShi is updated) then
28: Ris ← merge(Ris, FShi);
29: end if
Figure 2. Reputation updating algorithm
to keep either first hand or second hand information is also
initialized to be 〈1, 1〉 (line 2). Variables ti (line 3) is a
timestamp. Its initial value is t0 which is assumed to be the
starting time of the system. The line 4 initializes a buffer
set Nebi which is used to store received messages.
In Task 1 of layer 1 (lines 5-7), pi periodically broadcasts
FShi to its current neighbors. The function clocki() returns
pi’s current local clock time. The variable cycle identifies the
predefined broadcasting period. When pi sends a message
with FShi, the timestamp ti is also included to inform each
receiver about the freshness of its estimation. Thus a receiver
is able to test the freshness of the received estimations.
Task 2 (lines 8-12) is executed when a new first hand in-
formation is generated by pi. During its interaction with ps,
we assume that pi counts both the number of the satisfactory
transaction and the number of the unsatisfactory transaction.
These two informations are contained in Fhi. For example,
let us consider that message routing is the service provided
by ps. Suppose that pi transmits 10 messages to ps and
then it observes that ps forwards 8 messages among 10. In
this particular case, pi obtains 8 satisfactory transactions and
2 unsatisfactory transactions. Consequently, Fhi = [8, 2].
When the service’s interaction ends, pi sets FShi to Fhi
(line 9) and updates ti to the current local time (line 10).
As pi has the most up-to-date information, the second hand
information contained in Nebi become useless (line 11).
In task 3 (lines 13-25), when a new message 〈FShj , tj〉
is received, pi starts a selection process by comparing the
timestamps (lines 13-14). If the timestamp tj is equal to or
greater than ti, the new received message will be added into
Nebi, otherwise it will be discarded. As a Byzantine node
can propose a fake value with a recent timestamp, for safety
reasons, a message is not directly used to update FShi.
In line 14, pi stores the message into the set Nebi. If a
message from pj already exists in Nebi, the older one is
suppressed. If the received message has been logged into
Nebi, the test performed at line 16 is satisfied. The end
of task 3 (lines 17-24) allows to update FShi only when
enough messages have been gathered. First (line 17), all the
messages contained in Nebi are sorted into an ascending
order (according to the value of FShj contained in each
message). In line 18 (respectively 19) the number of values
which are greater (respectively smaller) than or equal to
v(FShi) is determined. The test evaluated by pi at line 20
defines two favorable cases: either pi has received values
that are greater than or equal to FShi from at least f + 1
different nodes, or pi has received values that are smaller
than or equal to FShi from at least f + 1 different nodes.
The result of the evaluation of this test depends mainly on
the number of messages that have been received: (a). if pi
has received less that f+1 messages from different trusters,
the test cannot be satisfied; (b) if pi has received messages
from at least 2f +1 different trusters, the test is necessarily
satisfied; (c) if pi has gathered more than f but less than
2f + 1 messages, the test can be satisfied or not. When the
test at line 20 fails, pi does not update FShi now. It will
continue to move and collect more messages. Otherwise, pi
starts the updating process. The procedure reducing (called
at line 21) suppresses risky messages from Nebi. If there
are less than f messages with values greater than its own
FShi, then pi suppresses all these messages (greater than
its own). Otherwise, pi suppresses the largest f inside Nebi.
Likewise, if there are less than f messages with values
smaller than its own FShi, then pi suppresses all these
messages (smaller than its own). Otherwise, pi suppresses
the smallest f inside Nebi. After the reducing operation,
the remaining values are copied into the set RNebi. At this
stage, all the values are both fresh and valid. Either they
have been proposed by a correct node or, when the sender
is a Byzantine node, the proposed value is neither to small
nor to large compared to all the fresh values provided by
correct nodes. The node pi updates FShi at line 22. Then
pi resets the buffer Nebi to ∅ at line 23. The new value
FSh′i is the result of an arithmetic average.
FSh′i = FShi +
∑
j
ajFShj (3)
Initially, FShi = [xi, yi]. For each FShj = [xj , yj] con-
tained in RNebi, a parameter aj equal to (xi+yi)/(xj+yj)
is used in the formula. As a consequence, if |RNebi| = κ,
then v(FSh′i) = (v(FShi)+
∑
j v(FShj))/(κ+1). More-
over, the following safety property is always satisfied.
Property 1: If v(FShk) and v(FShj) contained in
Nebi are respectively the minimum and the maximum
value proposed by correct nodes, then after the execu-
tion of line 22: min{v(FShk), v(FShi)} ≤ v(FSh
′
i) ≤
max{v(FShj), v(FShi)}.
Task 4 (line 26) continuously eliminates old values stored
in Nebi. Parameter ∆ is a given threshold which guarantees
that no received message can be stored in Nebi for more
than the maximum duration time period ∆.
When FShi is updated, an update of Ris at layer 2 is
also performed. The method merge called at line 28 returns
a new value Ris = λRis + FShi. The parameter λ is
a forgetting factor and satisfies 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. When λ is
close to 0, the new value of Ris is close to FShi. On the
contrary when λ is close to 1, the new value is more strongly
impacted by the past history.
VII. CONVERGENCE AND CONDITION
When the quality of service Sq is stable, all the first hand
informations v(Fh) provided by the correct nodes are in a
same interval [MinFh,MaxFh]. The size of this interval
depends on the subjectivity of the opinions expressed by
the correct nodes. The convergence property (definition 1)
states that eventually all the computed reputation scores will
also converge to this particular interval. In the algorithm,
the reputation score is updated (line 28) when a new FSh
is obtained locally. Even if the parameter λ slows down
the convergence process, it is obvious that the convergence
property is satisfied if eventually all the computed values
v(FSh) are in the expected interval. As the values v(FSh)
computed at line 9 are in this interval (by assumption), the
proof has just to focus on the values v(FSh) computed at
line 22. At any given time t, among all the correct nodes,
the minimum value and the maximum value of v(FSh)
are denoted vmin[t] and vmax[t] respectively. To prove
the convergence property, we have to show that eventually
vmin > MinFh− ǫ and vmax < MaxFh+ ǫ. In that case,
convergence is reached. Analyzing the variations of vmin
and vmax is complex because vmin (and in a similar way
vmax) may fluctuate (increase and later decrease again due
to the fact that older values are stored in logs Nebi). To rely
on a monotonic evolution of some values, we introduce the
concept of ”window”.
Due to the reset executed at line 26, a value can stay in the
log Nebi during at most ∆ units of time. Thus, at any time
tk, the oldest timestamp associated to a value contained in a
log of a correct node is possibly less than tk but greater than
forget(tk). The function forget(tk) is defined as follows: if
tk ≥ ∆, then forget(tk) = tk−∆, otherwise forget(tk) =
t−1 where t−1 is a virtual time corresponding to the time just
before the execution starts. Based on the function forget,
we introduce the concept of window. The window associated
to time tk is denoted W [tk]. It corresponds to a non empty
time interval (forget(tk), tk]. Suppose W [tk]/cycle = η,
thus at most η(n − f) values owned by the correct nodes
are proposed during W [tk]. Among these η(n − f) values
we can identify the minimum and the maximum value. We
denote them vWmin[tk] and v
Wmax[tk] respectively. Note
that W [tk] contains time tk, thus v
Wmin[tk] ≤ vmin[tk]
and vWmax[tk] ≥ vmax[tk].
Lemma 1: At time tk, if MinFh > v
Wmin[tk] then for
any t > tk, we have v
Wmin[tk] ≤ v
Wmin[t]. Similarly,
if MaxFh < vWmax[tk], then for any t > tk, we have
vWmax[tk] ≥ vWmax[t].
Lemma 2: At time tk, if MinFh ≤ vWmin[tk], then
for any t > tk, we have MinFh ≤ vWmin[t]. Similarly,
if MaxFh ≥ vWmax[tk], then for any t > tk, we have
MaxFh ≥ vWmax[t].
Due to lemma 1 and lemma 2, when the quality of
service is stable and all the first hand informations remain in
the range [MinFh,MaxFh], we conclude that vWmin >
MinFh− ǫ and vWmax < MaxFh+ ǫ. The convergence
property is satisfied.
To prove the convergence, a (necessary and sufficient)
condition has also to be defined. The correct trusters act
as sources of information and provides values that are
in the range [MinFh,MaxFh]. Any correct node must
receive (directly or indirectly) some recent first hand infor-
mations. Thus, while the convergence is not reached (either
vWmin < MinFh or vWmax > MaxFh), a condition
has to be satisfied by the dynamic multi-hops network. No
permanent partition should exist. The communication graph
must ensure, for any cut of set Vc, that the information can
flow from one part to another within a limited time period.
Moreover, It is necessary to assume the existence of a core of
at least f + 1 correct nodes that use frequently the service.
This subset of nodes is denoted Θ. During any period of
time ∆, those particular nodes will meet the trustee ps and
interact with it at least once.
VIII. SIMULATION
The simulation have been conducted on an open source
platform The one [14], which is currently prevalent in
DTN simulations. Each node plays simultaneously two roles
“trustee” and “truster”. Nodes move on a predefined graph
G = (Vg , Eg) represented by a square grid of size l × l
(|Vg| = l×l). We simulate two scenarios named respectively
random move and regional random move. In both scenarios
each node moves independently and can not move outside
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(b) Regional scenario
Figure 3. Simulation results - Convergence with a fixed value of Sq
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(a) random / 30000 steps
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(b) regional / 30000 steps
Figure 4. Simulation results - Convergence with a changing value of Sq
the graph. In random move, each node is initially located on
a vertex randomly selected from G. When a node arrives at
a vertex vx, it starts to select randomly its next destination
vy such that 〈vx, vy〉 ∈ Eg . The probability associated
to the different choices are equivalent. In regional random
move, nodes have different preferences. More precisely, G is
divided into Region1 and Region2 (Region1∪Region2 =
G). Correct nodes are also divided into two subsets V 1c
and V 2c . Initially, a correct node of V
1
c (respectively V
2
c )
is located on a vertex randomly selected from Region1
(respectively Region2). A node can select randomly its next
destination, except when it is at the border between Region1
and Region2. In this case, a node of V
1
c (respectively V
2
c )
has a lower probability to move into Region2 (respectively
Region1). The regional randommodel allows to test the case
where some nodes have more chances to access a particular
trustee than others. In both mobility scenarios, Byzantine
nodes perform random move. Besides, we assume they have
no stronger moving abilities (e.g. not a higher speed and no
possibility to jump from one place to another).
Each node pi provides a service with a quality of service
Sqi ∈ [0, 1]. It maintains two vectors ~Ri and
−−→
FShi. Inside
the vector, each entrance (Rij or FShij , j 6= i) is used to
keep information about the service provided by pj . Initially,
for all j 6= i, Rij = 〈1, 1〉 and FShij = 〈1, 1〉. pi sends
out
−−→
FShi periodically. A Byzantine node may send out
−−→
FSh
with fake values. Nodes can receive
−−→
FSh from another node
only when they are within the same communication range
(the losses of messages have not been simulated). When two
correct nodes pi and pj exchanges messages (either pi sends−−→
FShi to pj , or pj sends
−−→
FShj to pi), we assume the two
nodes also interact and obtain a first hand information about
each other. We assume that the rating v(Fh) is always equal
to the provided quality of service Sq. Each simulation lasts
259200 steps (simulate 72 hours).
Three different algorithms are tested and compared. The
first one is our algorithm. The two others (named Resilient
A1 and A2) are designed according to the related works
presented in section II. When dealing with first hand infor-
mation, A1 and A2 are similar to our algorithm. But the
way they manage second hand information is different. A1
is based on a deviation test. We set the deviation threshold to
0.1 which implies a correct node pi will suppress a second
hand information from pj if |v(FShi)−v(FShj)| > 0.1.A2
relies on trust levels to identify and merge compatible second
hand information. A correct node pi suppresses the second
hand informations that come from non-trusted nodes (if
v(Rij) ≤ 0.7), otherwise it merges second hand information
by weighted average: FSh′i = FShi + v(Rij)FShj .
Analysis of the convergence when Sq1 is fixed (maximum
differences: The grid size is fixed to 40×40 (1600 vertexes)
and the length of each edge is set to 100 (thus, the size of
the area is 4000× 4000). 25 nodes (including 5 Byzantine
nodes) are used in the simulation. Each of them has a
different id (from 1 to 25). Nodes with the id from 21 to
25 are the Byzantine nodes. In regional random move, node
1 to node 7 prefer to move in Region1 which occupies
a quarter of G on the bottom side. Other correct nodes
(id: 8 to 20) prefer to move in Region2 which occupies
three quarters of G on the top side. Every 10 steps, a node
broadcast
−−→
FSh. The communication range is set to 50. All
nodes have a same moving speed which is fixed to 30 per
step. Figure 3 shows the results when node id = 1 is
viewed as the trustee. As v(Fh) is assume to be equal to
Sq1 , we have MaxFh = MinFh in this case. The figure
shows the maximum differences between Sq1 which is fixed
and v(Ri1) (with pi ∈ Vc). Only our algorithm leads to
convergence in both scenarios.
Analysis of the convergence when Sq1 evolves (aggre-
gating rating): Reputation ratings from different correct
nodes can be aggregated by simple vector addition of the
components [9]. We still select node id = 1 as the trustee
and simulate the variation of aggregating value. The settings
of the simulation is almost the same as the simulation
for the convergence, except that Sq1 is randomly changed
during each 30000 simulation steps. At any time, v(Fh)
is assume to be equal to Sq1 . Thus the algorithm that
provides a curve more close to the curve of Sq1 has a better
performance. Figure 4 shows the results. Our algorithm
(which identifies fresh and valid inputs) shows again a better
performance. Furthermore, as the propagation mechanisms
requires time to reach all correct nodes, our algorithm shows
good performance when variation frequency of Sq decreases
(the corresponding figures are not provided).
IX. CONCLUSION
We investigate the reputation propagation and updating
problem in wireless mobile ad hoc networks with a few
Byzantine failures. Based on linear consensus, an algorithm
has been proposed which guarantees that only the messages
with fresh and valid values are accepted. When first hand
information is limited to the range [MinFh,MaxFh], we
investigate the convergence problem and provides a few hints
about the sufficient and necessary condition. Simulation
results show the interest of our algorithm.
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